XIII Belarusian International Media Forum “Partnership for the Future: Digital Agenda for the Media Sphere” 

Minsk, 13.09.2018 — Mas­ter class for stu­dents and polit­ic­al sci­ent­ists 

  • Hybrid War and Social Media Tech­no­lo­gies

Pro­fess­or, Doc­tor of Polit­ic­al Sci­ences, Head of the Inform­a­tion Spet­snaz Asso­ci­ation PANARIN IGOR NIKOLAEVICH

Hybrid war — what is it ?

  • Hybrid war is a com­bin­a­tion of mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al, polit­ic­al-dip­lo­mat­ic, fin­an­cial-eco­nom­ic, inform­a­tion-psy­cho­lo­gic­al and inform­a­tion-tech­nic­al meth­ods , as well as tech­no­lo­gies for col­or revolu­tions, ter­ror­ism and extrem­ism, spe­cial ser­vices, spe­cial forces, spe­cial oper­a­tions and pub­lic struc­tures dip­lomacy, car­ried out under a single plan by state author­it­ies, mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al blocs or TNCs.
  • The aims of the hybrid war are the com­plete or par­tial dis­in­teg­ra­tion of the state, a qual­it­at­ive change in its intern­al or for­eign policy, the replace­ment of state lead­er­ship by loy­al regimes, the estab­lish­ment of extern­al ideo­lo­gic­al and fin­an­cial-eco­nom­ic con­trol over the coun­try, its chaos and sub­or­din­a­tion to dic­tate by oth­er states or TNCs.

The Terminology and Doctrines of the Information War

  • A. Dalles (CIA) — 1967 — the first men­tion of “inform­a­tion war”
  • Thomas Rona — 1976, Shen Wei Guang (China) — 1985
  • The first doc­u­ment is the US Defense Min­istry Dir­ect­ive T 3600.1 of 21.12. 1992 — “Inform­a­tion war”.
  • Devel­op­ment — Doc­trine of Inform­a­tion Oper­a­tions of the US High Com­mand of the US Armed Forces of 1998, intro­duces the concept of defens­ive and offens­ive inform­a­tion oper­a­tions (2006 update — oper­a­tions on the Inter­net)
  • The first inter­na­tion­al con­fer­ence “Inform­a­tion war” — 1998, (Linz, Aus­tria — rep­res­ent­at­ives of 43 coun­tries par­ti­cip­ated)
  • The Stra­tegic Com­mu­nic­a­tions Concept of the USA — 2010. A set of meas­ures for tar­geted com­mu­nic­a­tion impact on the tar­get audi­ence of oth­er coun­tries (both hos­tile, allied and neut­ral).
  • Rus­sia
  • 2000 - The Doc­trine of Inform­a­tion Secur­ity of Rus­sia (FAPSI-1997)
  • 2016 — The Doc­trine of Inform­a­tion Secur­ity of Rus­sia (new edi­tion)

The Terminology and Doctrines of the Hybrid War

  • Major-Gen­er­al Alex­an­der Svechin
  • Lieu­ten­ant-Gen­er­al Andrei Snesar­ev
  • Col­on­el of the Rus­si­an Gen­er­al Staff Yev­geny Mess­ner — in exile
  • Mar­shal of the USSR Ogar­kov — Oper­a­tion DUNAI (August 1968 — Czechoslov­akia)
  • 2005 — The term “hybrid war” appeared in Amer­ic­an mil­it­ary lit­er­at­ure more than 10 years ago. In the United States in 2005, Amer­ic­an Gen­er­al James Mat­tis, now head of the Pentagon (nick­named “Mad Dog”), and Col­on­el Frank Hoff­man pub­lished the land­mark art­icle “The Future of War­fare: The Rise of the Hybrid Wars,” in which they added to the mil­it­ary doc­trine of the 1990s years of Gen­er­al Charles Krulak on the three blocks of war the fourth block. The three blocks of Krulak are the dir­ect con­duct of mil­it­ary oper­a­tions, peace­keep­ing oper­a­tions to divide the oppos­ing sides and provide human­it­ari­an assist­ance. The fourth, a new block of Mat­tis and Hoff­man — psy­cho­lo­gic­al and inform­a­tion oper­a­tions and work with the pub­lic.
  • In 2010, the concept of NATO intro­duced the term “hybrid” threats ”
  • In the final declar­a­tion of the NATO sum­mit held in Scot­land in Septem­ber 2014, for the first time at an offi­cial level, it was stated that it was neces­sary to pre­pare an alli­ance for par­ti­cip­a­tion in wars of a new type — hybrid wars.
  • And in Decem­ber 2015 at the sum­mit of the for­eign min­is­ters of NATO coun­tries a new strategy for con­duct­ing a hybrid war was adop­ted and approved at the NATO sum­mit in Warsaw in July 2016.

Hybrid war (GW) against Russia, the USSR and Eurasia

  • The GW meth­od­o­logy ori­gin­ated in the late 19th cen­tury. in the Brit­ish Empire. The FEVRAL coup d’état of 1917 , which led to the over­throw of the auto­cracy and the col­lapse of the Rus­si­an Empire, can be con­sidered a suc­cess­ful oper­a­tion of the GW against Rus­sia, car­ried out by West­ern Masonry and MI6, through the con­sol­id­a­tion of three con­spir­acies — palace, lib­er­al and treas­on gen­er­als.
  • The mod­ern West­ern strategy of the GW began to devel­op in the frame­work of the Cold War (1946–1991), unleashed against the USSR on the ini­ti­at­ive of Churchill. The Cold War was GW, (sanc­tions, ideo­lo­gic­al sab­ot­age, “agents of influ­ence” in the Soviet elite, draw­ing arms into the race, etc.). In the col­lapse of the USSR, the key role was played by the Gen­er­al Sec­ret­ary of the CPSU Cent­ral Com­mit­tee Mikhail Gorbachev, with the sup­port of three accom­plices (Yakovlev, Shevard­nadze, Kravchuk) . REYKJAVIK 1986 — Gorbachev’s sur­render in response to the mis­in­form­a­tion of Reagan’s SOI.
  • NATO’s GV Strategy against Rus­sia and Euras­ia - is aimed at dis­in­teg­ra­tion, cre­ation of chaos using the Part­ner­ship for Peace (PfP) pro­gram. Cre­ation in all CIS coun­tries of NETWORK Inform­a­tion Cen­ters , youth schools, sup­port to NGOs, media for­ums. For example, the NATO Inter­na­tion­al Youth School in Gelendzhik, which has been held reg­u­larly since 2002 on the basis of the Kuban State Uni­ver­sity (+ Moscow, St. Peters­burg, Veliky Novgorod). Travel of young lead­ers to NATO headquar­ters, etc. The most effect­ive strategy for NATO is imple­men­ted in Ukraine. In 1994, Ukraine, the first among the CIS coun­tries, joined the PfP pro­gram, and in 1997 the first Inform­a­tion and Doc­u­ment­a­tion Cen­ter in Europe opened in Kiev .

Hybrid Warfare Technologies

  • 1.Terrorism — 54% (from the pro­ject “GLADIO” to IGIL).
  • 2. Extrem­ism — 54%.
  • 3.Disinformation-76.5%
  •  White Hel­mets” -Brit­ish mis­in­form­ers in Syr­ia
  • 4.Information-psychological pres­sure — 67.5% ( Mi-6 = Skri­p­al).
  • 5. Mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al pres­sure — 72%.
  • 6.Financial and eco­nom­ic pres­sure — 67.5% (sanc­tions)
  • 7. Hack­er attacks -63%.
  • 8. Viol­a­tion of the func­tion­ing of crit­ic­al infrastructure-40.5%.
  • 9. “Col­or revolu­tions” — 72%.
  • FB: Bulk-2011 (82% -Both), Mustafa Nayem 2013 -100%
  • 10. Illeg­al and illeg­al migra­tion — 36%.
  • 11. Narcotrafic-40.5%.
  • 12. Use of Social Net­works — 63%.

Operation of British intelligence MI6SCRIPAL”: Information weapons are more dangerous than nuclear weapons 

  • Vir­tu­al Pois­on­ing S. Skri­p­al — an incid­ent that occurred on March 4, 2018 . in Salis­bury (Great Bri­tain) with a trait­or and his 33-year-old daugh­ter Julia, a Rus­si­an cit­izen who came from Moscow to vis­it her fath­er.
  • March 14, 2018 . Theresa May offi­cially accused Rus­sia of try­ing to kill Skri­p­al and his daugh­ter. May announced that in response to the pois­on­ing, bilat­er­al con­tacts with Rus­sia will be sus­pen­ded at a high level and that 23 Rus­si­an dip­lo­mats will be expelled from Great Bri­tain
  • On March 15, lead­ers of the United States, Bri­tain, France and Ger­many issued a joint state­ment con­demning the pois­on­ing of Skri­p­al and his daugh­ter and accus­ing Moscow of organ­iz­ing a chem­ic­al attack. In the state­ment, the attack was called “an encroach­ment on Brit­ish sov­er­eignty” and “a clear viol­a­tion of the Chem­ic­al Weapons Con­ven­tion and inter­na­tion­al law”.
  • On March 16, the Invest­ig­at­ive Com­mit­tee of Rus­sia opened a crim­in­al case under Art­icle 105.2 clause “e” of the Crim­in­al Code of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion (attemp­ted murder in a gen­er­ally dan­ger­ous man­ner) in con­nec­tion with the attemp­ted murder of a Rus­si­an cit­izen Yulia Skri­p­al
  • March 21 — brief­ing for for­eign ambas­sad­ors on the situ­ation with Skri­p­al — was superbly led by the Dir­ect­or of the Depart­ment of the Min­istry of For­eign Affairs of Rus­sia Vladi­mir Ermakov
  • April 3 - Head of the Brit­ish labor­at­ory “Por­ton Down” G. Eytken­head said that he can not con­firm that the nerve gas that was poisoned by Skri­p­al and his daugh­ter was pro­duced in Rus­sia. As he con­cluded, the labor­at­ory did not determ­ine its ori­gin, but provided sci­entif­ic inform­a­tion to the Brit­ish gov­ern­ment, which then used a num­ber of oth­er sources to draw con­clu­sions.
  • April 4 — SVR head S. Nary­shkin at the ISIS-2018 announced the pro­voca­tion of the Brit­ish spe­cial ser­vices (ambas­sad­or 2 Apr)
  • Septem­ber 5 — A new stage of the Stra­tegic anti-Rus­si­an Brit­ish Hybrid War oper­a­tion. Two Rus­si­ans sus­pec­ted of attempt­ing the Viol­ins are mem­bers of the GRU. With such a state­ment, abso­lutely unproven, the Brit­ish Prime Min­is­ter Theresa May made a speech.

Theory of Information Confrontation 
(doctoral thesis of Professor Igor Panarin on May 7, 1997)

  • Two types of inform­a­tion con­front­a­tion (struggle):
  • 1. inform­a­tion and tech­nic­al
  • 2.informatsionno-psychological.
  • At the inform­a­tion and tech­nic­al con­front­a­tion, the main objects of influ­ence and pro­tec­tion are inform­a­tion and tech­nic­al sys­tems (data trans­mis­sion sys­tems (SPD), inform­a­tion secur­ity sys­tems (SIS), etc.
  • At inform­a­tion-psy­cho­lo­gic­al con­front­a­tion the main objects of influ­ence and pro­tec­tion are:
  • 1. polit­ic­al psy­cho­logy and the pop­u­la­tion of oppos­ing sides;
  • 2. sys­tem of form­a­tion of pub­lic con­scious­ness
  • 3.System of form­a­tion of pub­lic opin­ion,
  • 4 Decision mak­ing sys­tem.
  • Inform­a­tion con­front­a­tion includes three com­pon­ents.
  • The first is Stra­tegic ana­lys­is.
  • The second is the Inform­a­tion Impact.
  • The third is the Inform­a­tion Coun­ter­ac­tion.

Social media — the alignment of forces 
The total domination of the West (data as of August 26, 2018)

  • FB 1.Gasdep USA — 1 893 811 sub­scribers of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion / USA — 1 to 6 
  • 2.MID of Rus­sia — 371 814
  • 3.MID UK — 224 723
  • 4.MID of Belarus — 2 239
  • TWITTER 1.Goldep USA — 5. 08 mil­lion sub­scribers of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion / USA — 1 to 5
  • 2.MID United King­dom — 874 thou­sand.
  • 3.MID of Rus­sia — 1.19 mil­lion.
  • 4.MID of Belarus — 11,7 thou­sand.
  • TITTER of glob­al media     RF / US — 1 to 21
  • 1. CNN (hot news) — 54.1 mil­lion
  • 2.VVS — (hot news) — 38.1 mil­lion
  • 3. RT - 2 , 66 mil­lion (in Eng­lish)
  • RF Min­istry of Defense / USA — Twit­ter 1 to 32 ( 174 thou­sand and 5.7 mil­lion) , FB — 1 to 7.6

Russia’s only breakthrough in //www.youtube.com /

  • Min­istry of Defense of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion / USA — 2/1
  • US - sub­scribers of 76 thou­sand
  • Rus­sia — 130 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Num­ber of views of Rus­sia / USA — 10/1
  • Rus­sia — 140 mil­lion
  • United States -14 mil­lion
  • Rus­sia — the largest views of com­mer­cials
  • 2015 — Massed impact with high-pre­ci­sion weapons on the objects of IGIL in Syr­ia from the water area of the Caspi­an Sea — 7.1 mil­lion
  • 2015 Air strikes against the objects of the ter­ror­ist group IGIL — 5.2 mil­lion
  • 2015 Massed attack by long-range avi­ation air­craft on infra­struc­ture facil­it­ies of IGIL in Syr­ia — 4 mil­lion • 2015 — Group launch of cruise mis­siles Caliber by Rostov-on-Don sub­mar­ine on tar­gets of ter­ror­ists in Syr­ia — 3.7 mil­lion

The total influence of the West in Russian social media (Medialogiya prepared the rating of the most cited media for 2017).

Top 8 most cited radio sta­tions in social media

No. Radio sta­tion Hyper­links in social media

Radio Liberty (svoboda.org) — 4,936,252

2 Echo of Moscow (echo.msk.ru) — 2 039 733

Voice of Amer­ica # Rus­si­an ser­vice (golos-ameriki.ru) — 794 769

4 Busi­ness FM (bfm.ru) — 328 014

5 Says Moscow (govoritmoskva.ru) — 309,493

6 Kom­mersant-FM (kommersant.ru/fm) — 219 147

7 Vesti FM (radiovesti.ru) — 51 483

8 Radio 1 (radio1.news) — 25,191

Strong influence of the West in Russian social media (Medialogiya prepared the rating of the most cited media for 2017)

Top 8 most cited Inter­net resources in social media

 Inter­net resource Hyper­links in social media

Meduza.io (Riga, Latvia) - 6,975,272

2 Rbc.ru — 5,870,500

3 Lenta.ru — 4 393 217

Life.ru - 3 681 338

5 Gazeta.ru — 3 326 125

Bbc.com/russian (United King­dom) - 2,998,364

7 Znak.com — 2 653 906

8 Navalny.com — 2 412 732

MEDUSA — NATO’s shock information tool in social media

  • Cre­ated on Octo­ber 20, 2014 . in Riga, a month and a half after the cre­ation in Riga of NATO’s Stra­tegic Com­mu­nic­a­tions Cen­ter. The work of the Cen­ter involves 7 NATO coun­tries — Esto­nia, Latvia, Ger­many, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Great Bri­tain.
  • FB — 334 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • VK — 557 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Twit­ter — 1.18 mil­lion
  • Accord­ing to Media­logy, fol­low­ing the res­ults of 2017, MEDUSA is the most quoted online pub­lic­a­tion in Rus­si­an social media. • Hypo­thes­is = MEDUSA is an ana­log of the spe­cial intel­li­gence unit of Brit­ish intel­li­gence MI6 “White Hel­mets” oper­at­ing in Syr­ia and pre­pared sev­er­al inform­a­tion pro­voca­tions related to the alleged use of chem­ic­al weapons.

Digit­al Dip­lomacy in the USA

  • Digit­al dip­lomacy (Digit­al Dip­lomacy) is the use of the Inter­net and mod­ern inform­a­tion and com­mu­nic­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies (ICT) for the real­iz­a­tion of dip­lo­mat­ic and related for­eign policy tasks. Also denoted by the terms “Net Dip­lomacy” and “Pub­lic Dip­lomacy Web 2.0.”
  • 1. Digit­al pro­pa­ganda.
    • First of all, the Inter­net makes it pos­sible for the State Depart­ment to bring its pos­i­tion dir­ectly to a multi-mil­lion audi­ence abroad, mostly young people, at min­im­al costs. To this end, the agency has cre­ated an extens­ive net­work of sites designed for extern­al con­sump­tion (inform­a­tion, lan­guage, dis­cus­sion) and offi­cial accounts in pop­u­lar social media (Twit­ter, Face­book, You­Tube, Flickr, Ins­tagram, Tumblr, Pin­terest, Google). Sup­port for accounts in social media is mainly handled by the men­tioned Office for Digit­al Inter­ac­tion, but spe­cial work­ing groups are also cre­ated to work with the tar­get audi­ence in vari­ous depart­ments of the State Depart­ment.
  • 2. Cre­ation of spe­cial soft­ware and hard­ware.
    • The State Depart­ment paid for the devel­op­ment of com­puter pro­grams that allow loy­al act­iv­ists to bypass restric­tions and con­trol by for­eign gov­ern­ments on nation­al com­mu­nic­a­tion chan­nels.
  • 3 . Stim­u­la­tion of protest moods with the help of social media .
    • In spring 2011, in Tunisia and Egypt, with the help of the Inter­net and mobile com­mu­nic­a­tions, youth groups were mobil­ized for mass per­form­ances, and the inform­a­tion cir­cu­lat­ing in the net­work served as a cata­lyst for the growth of protest sen­ti­ments. Social net­works, first of all, were used by the intern­al oppos­i­tion to coordin­ate activ­it­ies and recruit­ment of sup­port­ers, but it is also known that 70% of the mes­sages in Twit­ter (tweets), refer­ring, for example, to the “revolu­tion” in Egypt, were loc­ated with IP addresses, loc­ated out­side the coun­try. The lat­ter con­firms the ver­sion of extern­al inform­a­tion inter­fer­ence in the course of the “Arab Spring”, the tech­nic­al pos­sib­il­ity of which is only the United States. In June 2011, speak­ing in Lon­don, H. Clinton’s adviser on innov­a­tion A. Ross told the audi­ence that the import­ance of the Inter­net in under­min­ing author­it­ari­an regimes in the Arab East was decis­ive.
    • Amer­ic­an social net­works also played a key role in incit­ing oppos­i­tion sup­port­ers to actions of civil dis­obedi­ence in Tur­key in June-July 2013. Accord­ing to the meas­ure­ments of the Turk­ish com­pany eBrand­Value, which con­ducts mon­it­or­ing in the nation­al seg­ment of the Inter­net, the ratio of Twit­ter sub­scribers who called on to join demon­strat­ors in Tak­sim Square in Istan­bul , and those who spoke in sup­port of the cur­rent gov­ern­ment R. Erdogan, was 68 thou­sand to 800 . To manip­u­late polit­ic­al sen­ti­ments and to auto­mat­ic­ally rep­lic­ate the inform­a­tion sent, false accounts were widely used.
  • 4. Train­ing of Inter­net act­iv­ists
    • Digit­al dip­lomacy, as a way of influ­en­cing the pop­u­la­tion of oth­er states via the Inter­net, is mainly focused on two tar­get groups — act­ive youth and oppos­i­tion groups (dis­sid­ents, journ­al­ists, human rights defend­ers, etc.).In 2008, the US gov­ern­ment held the First Con­fer­ence in New York, which brought togeth­er young blog­gers and users and estab­lished a per­man­ent organ­iz­a­tion called the Alli­ance for Youth Move­ments, whose goal is to use the activ­ity of young people in the net­work to change the socio- polit­ic­al situ­ation in for­eign coun­tries. In 2009, a con­fer­ence of the Uni­on was held in Mex­ico City, and in 2010 — in Lon­don, etc. In the fall of 2010, the State Depart­ment put for­ward a so-called the Civil Soci­ety 2.0 ini­ti­at­ive. (Civil Soci­ety 2.0) to improve the effect­ive­ness of NGOs and oppos­i­tion groups abroad with the help of new digit­al tech­no­lo­gies. With­in its frame­work, sev­er­al pro­grams are imple­men­ted, the most fam­ous among which was the pro­ject Tech­Camp (Tech­no­lo­gic­al Camps). It is admin­istered by the Dip­lo­mat­ic Innov­a­tion Divi­sion at the Depart­ment of Inter­net Dip­lomacy of the State Depart­ment. Accord­ing to the Tech­Camp pro­gram, since 2010, dozens of tech­no­logy camps have been con­duc­ted in more than 30 coun­tries around the world. They were atten­ded by rep­res­ent­at­ives of about 2000 NGOs, media and gov­ern­ment agen­cies from more than 100 coun­tries. The camp is a one- or two-day sem­in­ar, which invites from 40 to 200 for­eign act­iv­ists (mostly oppos­i­tion) to listen to the course of lec­tures of West­ern IT spe­cial­ists of spe­cial ser­vices and solve their cur­rent prob­lems with their help.

Who opposes Medusa, Radio Liberty, Voice of Amer­ica

  • RT (Rus­si­an ver­sion of the site)
  • FB -1 276 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Twit­ter — 873 thou­sand sub­scribers (in Rus­si­an)
  • VK — 1 207 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • FB -1 646 thou­sand sub­scribers (TASS — 531 thou­sand, Inter­fax-19)
  • Twit­ter — 2 890 thou­sand sub­scribers (TASS — 436 thou­sand, Inter­fax-532)
  • VK — 1 207 thou­sand sub­scribers (TASS — 602 thou­sand, Inter­fax -35)
  • Radio “SATELLITE
  • FB — 68 thou­sand sub­scribers Voice of Amer­ica Rus­si­an ser­vice 586 thou­sand.
  • Twit­ter — 4,5 thou­sand sub­scribers Voice of Amer­ica Rus­si­an ser­vice 191 thou­sand.
  • VK — 49 thou­sand sub­scribers of VC — 19 thou­sand.
  • FB — 284 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Twit­ter — 1 250 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • VK — 130 thou­sand sub­scribers

The experience of China: “The Golden Shield”, it is the “Great Chinese Firewall”

  • The Golden Shield pro­ject is an Inter­net fil­ter­ing sys­tem that blocks access to resources banned by the Com­mun­ist Party from the extern­al Inter­net. Through­out the world, the “Golden Shield” is also known as the “Great Chinese Fire­wall” (The Great Fire­wall of China). Cen­sor­ship does not apply to the spe­cial admin­is­trat­ive regions of Hong Kong and Macau. The devel­op­ment of the pro­ject was star­ted in 1998 (Shen­Wai Guang), and in 2003 it was put into oper­a­tion through­out the coun­try. The pro­ject includes such sub­sys­tems as a secur­ity man­age­ment sys­tem (治安 管理 信息 系统), an inform­a­tion sys­tem on offenses (刑事 案件 信息 系统), an out­put and input con­trol sys­tem (出入境 管理 信息 系统), an inform­a­tion mon­it­or­ing sys­tem (监管 员 信息 系统), Traffic Man­age­ment Sys­tem (交通 管理 信息 系统).
  • Chinese Inter­net cen­sor­ship is not as simple as it seems at first glance. Ana­lys­is of con­tent fil­ter­ing in social net­works has shown that its goal is not total erad­ic­a­tion of any polit­ic­al or pub­lic cri­ti­cism, but pre­ven­tion of its growth into polit­ic­al speech or move­ment, includ­ing vir­tu­al one. The Golden Shield uses the fol­low­ing fil­ter­ing meth­ods:
  • IP Block­ing
  • Fil­ter­ing DNS requests and redir­ect­ing them
  • Block­ing Inter­net addresses ( URLs )
  • Fil­ter­ing in the Pack­et For­ward­ing Phase
  • Block­ing of VPN con­nec­tions

List of known services and sites blocked in China

  • Social net­works
  • Twit­ter, Face­book, Google+, Google Hangouts, Google Blog­spot, WordPress.com, Line, Kaka­oTalk, Talk­Box, some Tumblr, FC2 , Sound­Cloud, Hoot­suite, Adult­friend­find­er, Ustream, Twit­pic
  • Media and inform­a­tion sites
  • New York Times, New York Times Chinese, Bloomberg, Bloomberg Busi­nes­s­week, BBC Chinese, Chosun Chinese, WSJ , WSJ Chinese, Flip­board, Google News, You­Tube, Vimeo, Daily­mo­tion, LiveLeak, Break, Crackle, some art­icles Wiki­pe­dia, Wiki­pe­dia, Wikileaks
  • Google Search Engines , Duck­DuckGo, Baidu Japan, Baidu Brazil, Yahoo Hong Kong, Yahoo Taiwan
  • Applic­a­tion Ser­vices
  • Microsoft OneDrive, Drop­box, Slide­share, iStock­Photo, Google Drive, Google Docs, Gmail, Google Trans­late, Google Cal­en­dar, Google Groups, Google Keep
  • Oth­er online ser­vices
  • Flickr, Google Play, Google Picasa, Feed­burn­er, Bit.ly, Archive.org, Pastebin, Change.org, 4Shared, The Pir­ate Bay, Open­VPN

Goals and objectives of the Information Spetsnaz Association

  • 1.Association “Inform­a­tion Spet­snaz” is designed to devel­op activ­it­ies and inform­a­tion policy strategy in the interests of real­iz­ing the goals of the UN, estab­lish­ing busi­ness con­tacts, exchan­ging inform­a­tion, con­duct­ing expert and situ­ation­al ana­lys­is.
  • The goals of the UN , as enshrined in its Charter, are the main­ten­ance of inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity, the pre­ven­tion and elim­in­a­tion of threats to peace and the sup­pres­sion of acts of aggres­sion, the set­tle­ment or set­tle­ment by inter­na­tion­al means of peace­ful set­tle­ment of inter­na­tion­al dis­putes, the devel­op­ment of friendly rela­tions among nations based on respect for the prin­ciple of equal rights and self-determ­in­a­tion of peoples;inter­na­tion­al cooper­a­tion in eco­nom­ic, social, cul­tur­al and human­it­ari­an fields, the pro­mo­tion and devel­op­ment of respect for human rights and fun­da­ment­al freedoms for all without dis­tinc­tion as to race, sex, lan­guage or reli­gion.
  • Main goals
  • A). Coun­ter­ac­tion to the use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies for pro­pa­ganda of the ideo­logy of ter­ror­ism, • B). Neut­ral­iz­a­tion of inform­a­tion and psy­cho­lo­gic­al impact aimed at erod­ing tra­di­tion­al spir­itu­al and mor­al val­ues, • C).Improv­ing the effect­ive­ness of pre­ven­tion of offenses com­mit­ted using inform­a­tion tech­no­logy and coun­ter­act­ing such viol­a­tions, • E). Effect­ive coun­ter­ac­tion to the use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies for mil­it­ary and polit­ic­al pur­poses that are con­trary to inter­na­tion­al law.

Inform­a­tion Charter of the United Nations
Pro­ject of the Asso­ci­ation “Inform­a­tion Spet­snaz”

  • Pre­amble
  • Con­sid­er­ing the import­ance of the inform­a­tion space for the real­iz­a­tion of the goals of the United Nations (here­in­after referred to as the UN), tak­ing into account the res­ol­u­tion of the UN Gen­er­al Assembly A / RES / 65/41 of Decem­ber 8, 2010, “Advances in the field of inform­a­tion and com­mu­nic­a­tions in the con­text of inter­na­tion­al secur­ity” Have agreed as fol­lows:
  • 1.The pur­pose of this Charter is to coun­ter­act the use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies for the viol­a­tion of inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity, the cre­ation of an inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space, which is char­ac­ter­ized by peace, cooper­a­tion and har­mony.
  • 2. As the main threats in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space, lead­ing to the viol­a­tion of inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity, the fol­low­ing are con­sidered:
    • 1) use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies and means for car­ry­ing out hos­tile acts and acts of aggres­sion, includ­ing using glob­al media and social media;
    • 2) actions in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space with the aim of under­min­ing the mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al, fin­an­cial-eco­nom­ic and social sys­tems of anoth­er state, extern­al neg­at­ive inform­a­tion-psy­cho­lo­gic­al impact on the pop­u­la­tion, includ­ing using glob­al media and social media;
    • 3) use of the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space by state and non-state struc­tures, organ­iz­a­tions, groups and indi­vidu­als for ter­ror­ist and oth­er crim­in­al pur­poses;
    • 4) the cross-bor­der dis­tri­bu­tion of mis­in­form­a­tion and so-called “fake” inform­a­tion, which is con­trary to the prin­ciples and norms of inter­na­tion­al law, as well as nation­al laws of the states;
    • 5) use of glob­al media and social media to dis­sem­in­ate inform­a­tion that incites intereth­nic, inter­ra­cial and sec­tari­an enmity, mater­i­als, images or any oth­er rep­res­ent­a­tion of ideas or the­or­ies that pro­mote, incite or incite to hatred, dis­crim­in­a­tion or viol­ence against any per­son or group of indi­vidu­als, if, as a pre­text, factors based on race, skin col­or, nation­al or eth­nic ori­gin, and reli­gion are used for this;
    • 6) manip­u­la­tion of inform­a­tion flows in the inform­a­tion space of oth­er states, dis­in­form­a­tion and con­ceal­ment of inform­a­tion with the pur­pose of dis­tort­ing the psy­cho­lo­gic­al and spir­itu­al envir­on­ment of soci­ety, the erosion of tra­di­tion­al cul­tur­al, spir­itu­al, mor­al, eth­ic­al and aes­thet­ic val­ues.
  • 3.Activity of each UN mem­ber state and glob­al media in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space should be based on five basic prin­ciples:
    • 1. Dia­logue of civil­iz­a­tions.
    • 2. The work of peoples.
    • 3.Good things.
    • 4. Spir­itu­al sov­er­eignty.
    • 5.Dostoinstvo per­son­al­ity and people.
  • 4. States Parties to the United Nations resolve con­flicts in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space, primar­ily through nego­ti­ation, or oth­er peace­ful means of their choice in such a way that inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity are not endangered.
  • 5. In order to coun­ter­act the use of the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space for ter­ror­ist pur­poses, the UN mem­ber states:
    • 1) take meas­ures to coun­ter­act the use of the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space for ter­ror­ist pur­poses and recog­nize for this the need for joint, decis­ive action;
    • 2) will seek to devel­op com­mon approaches to stop the func­tion­ing of glob­al media and Inter­net resources that pro­mote ter­ror­ist activ­it­ies.
  • 6. Each state party to this Charter under­takes not to help, not to encour­age and coun­ter­act the actions of inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion ter­ror­ism, includ­ing mis­in­form­a­tion cam­paigns, using glob­al media and social media.
  • 7. The par­ti­cip­at­ing States of this Charter under­take to cooper­ate in the field of inform­a­tion incid­ents by report­ing them and cla­ri­fy­ing them to the spe­cial Cen­ter for Stra­tegic Ana­lys­is to Com­bat Inform­a­tion Ter­ror­ism under the UN Secur­ity Coun­cil.
    “Inform­a­tion incid­ent” means the unin­ten­ded impact of the state on the inform­a­tion envir­on­ment of the soci­ety of the state party to this Charter, which has led to neg­at­ive con­sequences.