Minsk, 09/12/2018 
XIII Belarus­i­an Inter­na­tion­al Media For­um “Part­ner­ship for the Future: A Digit­al Agenda for the Media Sphere” Plen­ary Ses­sion

Pro­fess­or, Doc­tor of Polit­ic­al Sci­ences, Head of the Inform­a­tion Spet­snaz Asso­ci­ation

Hybrid war — what is it ?

  • Hybrid war is a com­bin­a­tion of mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al, polit­ic­al-dip­lo­mat­ic, fin­an­cial-eco­nom­ic, inform­a­tion-psy­cho­lo­gic­al and inform­a­tion-tech­nic­al meth­ods , as well as tech­no­lo­gies for col­or revolu­tions, ter­ror­ism and extrem­ism, spe­cial ser­vices, spe­cial forces, spe­cial oper­a­tions and pub­lic struc­tures dip­lomacy, car­ried out under a single plan by state author­it­ies, mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al blocs or TNCs.
  • The aims of the hybrid war are the com­plete or par­tial dis­in­teg­ra­tion of the state, a qual­it­at­ive change in its intern­al or for­eign policy, the replace­ment of state lead­er­ship by loy­al regimes, the estab­lish­ment of extern­al ideo­lo­gic­al and fin­an­cial-eco­nom­ic con­trol over the coun­try, its chaos and sub­or­din­a­tion to dic­tate by oth­er states or TNCs.

Hybrid Warfare Technologies

  • 1.Terrorism — 54% (from the pro­ject “GLADIO” to IGIL).
  • 2. Extrem­ism — 54%.
  • 3.Disinformation-76.5%
  •  White Hel­mets” -Brit­ish mis­in­form­ers in Syr­ia
  • 4.Information-psychological pres­sure — 67.5% ( Mi-6 = Skri­p­al).
  • 5. Mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al pres­sure — 72%.
  • 6.Financial and eco­nom­ic pres­sure — 67.5% (sanc­tions)
  • 7. Hack­er attacks -63%.
  • 8. Viol­a­tion of the func­tion­ing of crit­ic­al infrastructure-40.5%.
  • 9. “Col­or revolu­tions” — 72%.
  • FB: Bulk-2011 (82% -Both), Mustafa Nayem 2013 -100%
  • 10. Illeg­al and illeg­al migra­tion — 36%.
  • 11. Narcotrafic-40.5%.
  • 12. Use of Social Net­works — 63%.

Operation of British intelligence MI6SCRIPAL”: Creating a global disinformation environment 

  • Vir­tu­al Pois­on­ing S. Skri­p­al — an incid­ent that occurred on March 4, 2018 . in Salis­bury (Great Bri­tain) with a trait­or and his 33-year-old daugh­ter Julia, a Rus­si­an cit­izen who came from Moscow to vis­it her fath­er.
  • March 14, 2018 . Theresa May offi­cially accused Rus­sia of try­ing to kill Skri­p­al and his daugh­ter. May announced that in response to the pois­on­ing, bilat­er­al con­tacts with Rus­sia will be sus­pen­ded at a high level and that 23 Rus­si­an dip­lo­mats will be expelled from Great Bri­tain
  • On March 15, lead­ers of the United States, Bri­tain, France and Ger­many issued a joint state­ment con­demning the pois­on­ing of Skri­p­al and his daugh­ter and accus­ing Moscow of organ­iz­ing a chem­ic­al attack. In the state­ment, the attack was called “an encroach­ment on Brit­ish sov­er­eignty” and “a clear viol­a­tion of the Chem­ic­al Weapons Con­ven­tion and inter­na­tion­al law”.
  • On March 16, the Invest­ig­at­ive Com­mit­tee of Rus­sia opened a crim­in­al case under Art­icle 105.2 clause “e” of the Crim­in­al Code of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion (attemp­ted murder in a gen­er­ally dan­ger­ous man­ner) in con­nec­tion with the attemp­ted murder of a Rus­si­an cit­izen Yulia Skri­p­al
  • March 21 — brief­ing for for­eign ambas­sad­ors on the situ­ation with Skri­p­al — was superbly led by the Dir­ect­or of the Depart­ment of the Min­istry of For­eign Affairs of Rus­sia Vladi­mir Ermakov
  • April 3 - Head of the Brit­ish labor­at­ory “Por­ton Down” G. Eytken­head said that he can not con­firm that the nerve gas that was poisoned by Skri­p­al and his daugh­ter was pro­duced in Rus­sia. As he con­cluded, the labor­at­ory did not determ­ine its ori­gin, but provided sci­entif­ic inform­a­tion to the Brit­ish gov­ern­ment, which then used a num­ber of oth­er sources to draw con­clu­sions.
  • April 4 — SVR head S. Nary­shkin at the ISIS-2018 announced the pro­voca­tion of the Brit­ish spe­cial ser­vices (ambas­sad­or 2 Apr)
  • Septem­ber 5 — A new stage of the Stra­tegic anti-Rus­si­an Brit­ish Hybrid War oper­a­tion. Two Rus­si­ans sus­pec­ted of attempt­ing the Viol­ins are mem­bers of the GRU. With such a state­ment, abso­lutely unproven, the Brit­ish Prime Min­is­ter Theresa May made a speech.

Theory of Information Confrontation 
(doctoral thesis of Professor Igor Panarin on May 7, 1997)

  • Two types of inform­a­tion con­front­a­tion (struggle):
  • 1. inform­a­tion and tech­nic­al
  • 2.informatsionno-psychological.
  • At the inform­a­tion and tech­nic­al con­front­a­tion, the main objects of influ­ence and pro­tec­tion are inform­a­tion and tech­nic­al sys­tems (data trans­mis­sion sys­tems (SPD), inform­a­tion secur­ity sys­tems (SIS), etc.
  • At inform­a­tion-psy­cho­lo­gic­al con­front­a­tion the main objects of influ­ence and pro­tec­tion are:
  • 1. polit­ic­al psy­cho­logy and the pop­u­la­tion of oppos­ing sides;
  • 2. sys­tem of form­a­tion of pub­lic con­scious­ness
  • 3.System of form­a­tion of pub­lic opin­ion,
  • 4 Decision mak­ing sys­tem.
  • Inform­a­tion con­front­a­tion includes three com­pon­ents.
  • The first is Stra­tegic ana­lys­is.
  • The second is the Inform­a­tion Impact.
  • The third is the Inform­a­tion Coun­ter­ac­tion.

Social media — the alignment of forces 
The total domination of the West (data as of August 26, 2018) 

  • FB 1.Gasdep USA — 1 893 811 sub­scribers of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion / USA — 1 to 6
  • 2.MID of Rus­sia — 371 814
  • 3.MID UK — 224 723
  • 4.MID of Belarus — 2 239
  • TWITTER 1.Goldep USA — 5. 08 mil­lion sub­scribers of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion / USA — 1 to 5
  • 2.MID United King­dom — 874 thou­sand.
  • 3.MID of Rus­sia — 1.19 mil­lion.
  • 4.MID of Belarus — 11,7 thou­sand.
  • TITTER of glob­al media     RF / US — 1 to 21
  • 1. CNN (hot news) — 54.1 mil­lion
  • 2.VVS — (hot news) — 38.1 mil­lion
  • 3. RT - 2 , 66 mil­lion (in Eng­lish)
  • RF Min­istry of Defense / USA — Twit­ter 1 to 32 ( 174 thou­sand and 5.7 mil­lion) , FB — 1 to 7.6

Russia’s only breakthrough 
at //www.youtube.com/

  • Min­istry of Defense of the Rus­si­an Fed­er­a­tion / USA — 2/1
  • US - sub­scribers of 76 thou­sand
  • Rus­sia — 130 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Num­ber of views of Rus­sia / USA — 10/1
  • Rus­sia — 140 mil­lion
  • United States -14 mil­lion
  • Rus­sia — the largest views of com­mer­cials
  • 2015 — Massed impact with high-pre­ci­sion weapons on the objects of IGIL in Syr­ia from the water area of the Caspi­an Sea — 7.1 mil­lion
  • 2015 Air strikes against the objects of the ter­ror­ist group IGIL — 5.2 mil­lion
  • 2015 Massed attack by long-range avi­ation air­craft on infra­struc­ture facil­it­ies of IGIL in Syr­ia — 4 mil­lion • 2015 — Group launch of cruise mis­siles Caliber by Rostov-on-Don sub­mar­ine on tar­gets of ter­ror­ists in Syr­ia — 3.7 mil­lion

The total influence of the West in Russian social media (Medialogiya prepared the rating of the most cited media for 2017).

Top 8 most cited radio sta­tions in social media

 Radio sta­tion - Hyper­links in social media

Radio Liberty ( svoboda.org) — 4,936,252

2 Echo of Moscow (echo.msk.ru) — 2 039 733

Voice of Amer­ica # Rus­si­an ser­vice (golos-ameriki.ru) — 794 769

4 Busi­ness FM (bfm.ru) — 328 014

5 Says Moscow (govoritmoskva.ru) — 309,493

6 Kom­mersant-FM (kommersant.ru/fm) — 219 147

Vesti FM (radiovesti.ru) - 51 483

Radio 1 ( radio1.news) - 25,191

Strong influence of the West in Russian social media (Medialogiya prepared the rating of the most cited media for 2017)

Top 8 most cited Inter­net resources in social media

 Inter­net resource - Hyper­links in social media

Meduza.io (Riga, Latvia) - 6,975,272

2 Rbc.ru — 5,870,500

3 Lenta.ru — 4 393 217

Life.ru - 3 681 338

5 Gazeta.ru — 3 326 125

Bbc.com/russian (United King­dom) - 2,998,364

7 Znak.com — 2 653 906

8 Navalny.com — 2 412 732

MEDUSA — NATO’s shock information tool in social media

  • Cre­ated on Octo­ber 20, 2014 . in Riga, a month and a half after the cre­ation in Riga of NATO’s Stra­tegic Com­mu­nic­a­tions Cen­ter. The work of the Cen­ter involves 7 NATO coun­tries — Esto­nia, Latvia, Ger­many, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Great Bri­tain.
  • FB — 334 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • VK — 557 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Twit­ter — 1.18 mil­lion
  • Accord­ing to Media­logy, fol­low­ing the res­ults of 2017, MEDUSA is the most quoted online pub­lic­a­tion in Rus­si­an social media. • Hypo­thes­is = MEDUSA is an ana­log of the spe­cial intel­li­gence unit of Brit­ish intel­li­gence MI6 “White Hel­mets” oper­at­ing in Syr­ia and pre­pared sev­er­al inform­a­tion pro­voca­tions related to the alleged use of chem­ic­al weapons.

Who opposes Medusa, Radio Liberty, Voice of America

  • RT (Rus­si­an ver­sion of the site)
  • FB -1 276 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Twit­ter — 873 thou­sand sub­scribers (in Rus­si­an)
  • VK — 1 207 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • FB -1 646 thou­sand sub­scribers (TASS — 531 thou­sand, Inter­fax-19)
  • Twit­ter — 2 890 thou­sand sub­scribers (TASS — 436 thou­sand, Inter­fax-532)
  • VK — 1 207 thou­sand sub­scribers (TASS — 602 thou­sand, Inter­fax -35)
  • Radio “SATELLITE
  • FB — 68 thou­sand sub­scribers Voice of Amer­ica Rus­si­an ser­vice 586 thou­sand.
  • Twit­ter — 4,5 thou­sand sub­scribers Voice of Amer­ica Rus­si­an ser­vice 191 thou­sand.
  • VK — 49 thou­sand sub­scribers of VC — 19 thou­sand.
  • FB — 284 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • Twit­ter — 1 250 thou­sand sub­scribers
  • VK — 130 thou­sand sub­scribers

The experience of China: “The Golden Shield”, it is the “Great Chinese Firewall”

  • The Golden Shield pro­ject is an Inter­net fil­ter­ing sys­tem that blocks access to resources banned by the Com­mun­ist Party from the extern­al Inter­net. Through­out the world, the “Golden Shield” is also known as the “Great Chinese Fire­wall” (The Great Fire­wall of China). Cen­sor­ship does not apply to the spe­cial admin­is­trat­ive regions of Hong Kong and Macau. The pro­ject was developed in 1998 (Shen Wei Guang), and in 2003 it was put into oper­a­tion through­out the coun­try. The pro­ject includes such sub­sys­tems as a secur­ity man­age­ment sys­tem (治安 管理 信息 系统), an inform­a­tion sys­tem on offenses (刑事 案件 信息 系统), an out­put and input con­trol sys­tem (出入境 管理 信息 系统), an inform­a­tion mon­it­or­ing sys­tem (监管 员 信息 系统), Traffic Man­age­ment Sys­tem (交通 管理 信息 系统).
  • Chinese Inter­net cen­sor­ship is not as simple as it seems at first glance. Ana­lys­is of con­tent fil­ter­ing in social net­works has shown that its goal is not total erad­ic­a­tion of any polit­ic­al or pub­lic cri­ti­cism, but pre­ven­tion of its growth into polit­ic­al speech or move­ment, includ­ing vir­tu­al one. The Golden Shield uses the fol­low­ing fil­ter­ing meth­ods:
  • IP Block­ing
  • Fil­ter­ing DNS requests and redir­ect­ing them
  • Block­ing Inter­net addresses ( URLs )
  • Fil­ter­ing in the Pack­et For­ward­ing Phase
  • Block­ing of VPN con­nec­tions

Goals and objectives of the Information Spetsnaz Association

  • 1.Association “Inform­a­tion Spet­snaz” is designed to devel­op activ­it­ies and inform­a­tion policy strategy in the interests of real­iz­ing the goals of the UN, estab­lish­ing busi­ness con­tacts, exchan­ging inform­a­tion, con­duct­ing expert and situ­ation­al ana­lys­is.
  • The goals of the UN , as enshrined in its Charter, are the main­ten­ance of inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity, the pre­ven­tion and elim­in­a­tion of threats to peace and the sup­pres­sion of acts of aggres­sion, the set­tle­ment or set­tle­ment by inter­na­tion­al means of peace­ful set­tle­ment of inter­na­tion­al dis­putes, the devel­op­ment of friendly rela­tions among nations based on respect for the prin­ciple of equal rights and self-determ­in­a­tion of peoples; inter­na­tion­al cooper­a­tion in eco­nom­ic, social, cul­tur­al and human­it­ari­an fields, the pro­mo­tion and devel­op­ment of respect for human rights and fun­da­ment­al freedoms for all without dis­tinc­tion as to race, sex, lan­guage or reli­gion.
  • Main goals
    • A). Coun­ter­ac­tion to the use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies for pro­pa­ganda of the ideo­logy of ter­ror­ism,
    • B). Neut­ral­iz­a­tion of inform­a­tion and psy­cho­lo­gic­al impact aimed at erod­ing tra­di­tion­al spir­itu­al and mor­al val­ues,
    • FROM). Increas­ing the effect­ive­ness of pre­ven­tion of offenses com­mit­ted using inform­a­tion tech­no­logy, and coun­ter­act­ing such viol­a­tions,
    • E). Effect­ive coun­ter­ac­tion to the use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies for mil­it­ary and polit­ic­al pur­poses that are con­trary to inter­na­tion­al law

Information Charter of the United Nations
Project of the Association “Information Spetsnaz”

  • Pre­amble
  • Con­sid­er­ing the import­ance of the inform­a­tion space for the real­iz­a­tion of the goals of the United Nations (here­in­after referred to as the UN), tak­ing into account the res­ol­u­tion of the UN Gen­er­al Assembly A / RES / 65/41 of Decem­ber 8, 2010, “Advances in the field of inform­a­tion and com­mu­nic­a­tions in the con­text of inter­na­tion­al secur­ity” Have agreed as fol­lows:
  • • 1.The pur­pose of this Charter is to coun­ter­act the use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies for the viol­a­tion of inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity, the cre­ation of an inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space that is char­ac­ter­ized by peace, cooper­a­tion and har­mony.
  • 2. As the main threats in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space, lead­ing to the viol­a­tion of inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity, the fol­low­ing are con­sidered:
    • 1) use of inform­a­tion tech­no­lo­gies and means for car­ry­ing out hos­tile acts and acts of aggres­sion, includ­ing using glob­al media and social media;
    • 2) actions in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space with the aim of under­min­ing the mil­it­ary-polit­ic­al, fin­an­cial-eco­nom­ic and social sys­tems of anoth­er state, extern­al neg­at­ive inform­a­tion-psy­cho­lo­gic­al impact on the pop­u­la­tion, includ­ing using glob­al media and social media;
    • 3) use of the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space by state and non-state struc­tures, organ­iz­a­tions, groups and indi­vidu­als for ter­ror­ist and oth­er crim­in­al pur­poses;
    • 4) the cross-bor­der dis­tri­bu­tion of mis­in­form­a­tion and so-called “fake” inform­a­tion, which is con­trary to the prin­ciples and norms of inter­na­tion­al law, as well as nation­al laws of the states;
    • 5) use of glob­al media and social media to dis­sem­in­ate inform­a­tion that incites intereth­nic, inter­ra­cial and sec­tari­an enmity, mater­i­als, images or any oth­er rep­res­ent­a­tion of ideas or the­or­ies that pro­mote, incite or incite to hatred, dis­crim­in­a­tion or viol­ence against any per­son or group of indi­vidu­als, if, as a pre­text, factors based on race, skin col­or, nation­al or eth­nic ori­gin, and reli­gion are used for this;
    • 6) manip­u­la­tion of inform­a­tion flows in the inform­a­tion space of oth­er states, dis­in­form­a­tion and con­ceal­ment of inform­a­tion with the pur­pose of dis­tort­ing the psy­cho­lo­gic­al and spir­itu­al envir­on­ment of soci­ety, the erosion of tra­di­tion­al cul­tur­al, spir­itu­al, mor­al, eth­ic­al and aes­thet­ic val­ues.
  • 3.Activity of each UN mem­ber state and glob­al media in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space should be based on five basic prin­ciples:
    • 1. Dia­logue of civil­iz­a­tions.
    • 2. The work of peoples.
    • 3.Good things.
    • 4. Spir­itu­al sov­er­eignty.
    • 5.Dostoinstvo per­son­al­ity and people.
  • 4. States Parties to the United Nations resolve con­flicts in the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space, primar­ily through nego­ti­ation, or oth­er peace­ful means of their choice in such a way that inter­na­tion­al peace and secur­ity are not endangered.
  • 5. In order to coun­ter­act the use of the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space for ter­ror­ist pur­poses, the UN mem­ber states:
    • 1) take meas­ures to coun­ter­act the use of the inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion space for ter­ror­ist pur­poses and recog­nize for this the need for joint, decis­ive action;
    • 2) will seek to devel­op com­mon approaches to stop the func­tion­ing of glob­al media and Inter­net resources that pro­mote ter­ror­ist activ­it­ies.
  • 6. Each state party to this Charter under­takes not to help, not to encour­age and coun­ter­act the actions of inter­na­tion­al inform­a­tion ter­ror­ism, includ­ing mis­in­form­a­tion cam­paigns, using glob­al media and social media.
  • 7. The par­ti­cip­at­ing States of this Charter under­take to cooper­ate in the field of inform­a­tion incid­ents by report­ing them and cla­ri­fy­ing them to the spe­cial Cen­ter for Stra­tegic Ana­lys­is to Com­bat Inform­a­tion Ter­ror­ism under the UN Secur­ity Coun­cil.
    “Inform­a­tion incid­ent” means the unin­ten­ded impact of the state on the inform­a­tion envir­on­ment of the soci­ety of the state party to this Charter, which has led to neg­at­ive con­sequences.